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 Abstract 
Non-convergence amongst the EU member states, despite a wide range of integration 
effects, has come to be accepted as conventional wisdom in the Europeanization debate. 
This paper takes issue with the stress on non-convergence and makes a case for ‘clustered 
Europeanization’. Clustering is promoted by two variables that have so far received little 
attention in Europeanization research: territory and temporality. Territory influences 
Europeanization through (a) ‘families of nations’ and (b) center-periphery structures in an 
expanding European political space. Temporality matters, in particular, through the ‘relative 
time of accession’, i.e. when countries joined (c) in relation to their domestic political and 
economic development and (d) in relation to the phase of European integration. While (a) 
and (c) promote intra-regional commonalities in Europeanization-related domestic variables, 
(b) and (d) highlight inter-regional differences in the integration experience. This regional 
distinctness of both domestic and integration variables, in turn, promotes clustered 
Europeanization. 
Zusammenfassung 
Ein Großteil der Europäisierungsforschung geht davon aus, dass die europäische Integration 
trotz weitreichender nationaler Effekte nicht zu einer Konvergenz der Mitgliedstaaten führt. 
Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt diese Sichtweise in Frage und weist auf die Existenz von 
‚Europäisierungsclustern’ hin. Diese Clusterbildung lässt sich auf zwei Faktorbündel 
zurückführen, die in der einschlägigen Forschung bislang kaum Beachtung gefunden haben: 
Territorialität und Zeitlichkeit. Territorialität beeinflusst Europäisierung insbesondere durch 
(a) die Existenz von geographisch definierten „families of nations“ und (b) den Wandel des 
Verhältnisses zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie in einem sich ausdehnenden europäischen 
politischen Raum. Zeitlichkeit bezieht sich vor allem auf den Beitrittszeitpunkt eines Landes. 
Das Muster der nationalen Reaktion auf die europäische Integration wird davon geprägt, (c) 
welche politischen und ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen zum Zeitpunkt des Beitritts auf 
der nationalen Ebene vorherrschten und (d) in welcher Phase sich die europäische 
Integration zum diesem Zeitpunkt befand. Während (a) und (c) dafür verantwortlich sind, 
dass binnenstaatliche Bestimmungsfaktoren der Europäisierung regionenspezifisch verteilt 
sind, verbinden sich (b) und (d) mit einer wiederum regionenspezifischen Ausprägung 
integrationsbezogener Variablen. Zusammen begünstigten sie das Entstehen spezifischer 
Europäisierungscluster. 
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1. Beyond Non-Convergence: The Case for Clustered 
Europeanization 
Non-convergence amongst the EU member states, despite a wide range of integration 
effects, has come to be accepted as conventional wisdom in the Europeanization debate. 
This literature follows in the footsteps of the work by Héritier et al. (2001), who highlighted 
‘differential responses to European policies’ and tried to solve the puzzle of why ‘members 
states’ policies (…) respond so differently to identical European policy demands and similar 
external and internal conditions’ (p. 257). One of the key findings of Wessels et al.’s (2003: 
xv) research on institutional reactions to integration at the national level in the EU-15 is ‘that 
of non-convergence amongst the Member States (…). Traditional national models are 
resistant and apparently flexible enough to induce complacency about one’s own 
performance’. In a similar vein, Page (2003: 163) has argued that ‘domestic politico-
administrative systems do adapt their systems so that Europeanization as impact can remain 
high while producing little by way of Europeanization as homogenization’. Kassim (2000; 
2003), in summarizing research on the central national coordination of EU policy, notes 
‘Although not insignificant, the similarities between the coordination systems created by the 
member states are overshadowed by the differences that emerge from detailed inspection’ 
(2003: 91). Finally, a major comparative study on the ‘Europeanization of national 
environmental policy’ (Jordan/Liefferink 2005), covering ten member states, concludes that 
evidence for convergence towards a single model is lacking and that policy styles and 
structures, in particular, continue to diverge.  
As Héritier et al. (2001) noted in their study, this finding is puzzling. European integration is 
not a ‘weak variable’, in that most contributions associate it with major substantive effects; 
but it does not appear to drive public policy, and still less domestic political institutions and 
processes – polity and politics – in any particular direction. The basic reasons for the 
apparently highly variegated patterns of effects provided by the Europeanization literature 
can be summarized quite briefly. First, the domestic starting conditions from which the 
European effects make themselves felt and domestic ‘intervening’ or ‘facilitating’ variables 
that have a decisive influence on Europeanization trajectories vary enormously. (Relevant 
analyses have covered a wide array of country-specific political, institutional and policy 
factors and range from macro-analyses, such as Vivien Schmidt’s (2006) distinction between 
’simple’ and ‘compound’ polities, to very fine-grained reconstructions of case-specific 
institutional, actor and policy constellations.) Second, the manner in which different member 
states relate to the EU, e.g., in terms of their ‘uploading capacities’ varies enormously. In the 
face of this diversity in starting conditions and domestic and integration-related variables, EU 
integration does not produce major convergence.  
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This article questions the predominant stress on non-convergence and makes a case for 
‘clustered Europeanization’, i.e. the existence of multi-country groupings that are 
characterized by high levels of intra-regional commonality and inter-regional differences in 
both substance and modes of Europeanization. This clustering is promoted by two variables 
that have so far received little attention in Europeanization research: territory and 
temporality. Territory influences Europeanization primarily through (a) ‘families of nation’ and 
(b) center-periphery structures in an expanding European political space. Temporality 
matters, in particular, through the time of accession (c) in relation to domestic political and 
economic development and (d) in relation to the phase of European integration. While (a) 
and (c) are associated with, and further promote, intra-regional commonalities in 
Europeanization-related domestic variables, (b) and (d) highlight inter-regional differences in 
the integration experience (see Figure 1). Territory and temporality are not, therefore, 
alternatives to domestic and integration-related explanations of Europeanization. Rather, 
once we consider territory and temporality systematically, it becomes clear that domestic 
variables and integration patterns are not distributed randomly across Europe, but do, in fact, 
follow a fairly clear pattern, promoting clustered Europeanization. 
Figure 1: Territory, Temporality and Commonality in Explanatory Variables 
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variables 
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2. Territory: Families of Nations and Center-Periphery 
Relations 
The impact of European integration on the territorial structuring of politics and territoriality as 
a fundamental ordering principle of political life embodied in the modern nation-state is at the 
heart of a vigorous debate in International Relations and Comparative Politics (Ansell/di 
Palma 2004; Bartolini 2004; 2005). At first sight, this debate is only loosely connected to the I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 3 
Europeanization literature. Of course, students of Europeanization have inquired into the 
links between integration and multi-level governance. But issues about the broader territorial 
restructuring of the European political space have largely been left to those who work on 
integration and transnationalization, whereas the empirical focus of the Europeanization 
literature is the individual member state. Similarly, the dominant explanations for patterns of 
Europeanization focus on the individual member states, with an emphasis, as already noted, 
on country-specific starting conditions and domestic variables and the manner in which 
individual countries relate to the EU. There is, however, a strong territorial dimension to 
these variables, which, in turn, encourages clustered Europeanization. Two types of 
explanations from which Europeanization research may draw inspiration are worth 
highlighting: the notion of ‘families of nations’ (Castles 1993) and associated debates, which 
draw attention to shared domestic characteristics across borders, how they might have come 
about and how they are maintained and strengthened over time; and arguments about 
center-periphery dynamics in the process of European integration, which take their principal 
clues from the work of Rokkan (1999). 
The ‘families of nations’ notion suggests that domestic variables that may affect patterns of 
Europeanization – be they institutional, ideational, ideological, actor- or policy-related – are 
not distributed randomly amongst countries, but are likely to show cross-regional variation. 
As initially set out by Castles (1993), the notion has three components: first, ‘that it may be 
possible to identify distinct families of nations, defined in terms of shared geographical, 
linguistic, cultural and/or historical attributes’ (xiii); second, that processes of cross-national 
‘transmission and diffusion’ are critical to establishing and perpetuating these commonalities; 
and, third, that families of nations matter for public policy profiles to the extent that ‘the 
commonalities of policy outcomes that characterize groupings of nations could be explained, 
in whole or in part, by common ideas, common customs and common institutions transmitted 
from the past’ (xvi).  
What can be gained from these ideas for the analysis of Europeanization? The first 
proposition is probably the least contentious and although ‘family membership’ need not 
necessarily imply spatial proximity, there is often an element of a shared geographical space 
that underlies comparative institutional and policy analysis, as, e.g., in the debate on ‘worlds 
of welfare’ (Esping-Andersen 1990). Successive enlargements of the EU have, of course, 
followed a path that coincides quite closely, although by no means perfectly, with the most 
commonly employed distinction between a continental Western Europe, Anglo-Saxon 
Europe, Southern Europe, the Nordic region, and Central and Eastern Europe. If one 
accepts that these are more than purely geographical labels, then more or less distinct 
groups of nations have joined the integration process at particular stages of the integration 
project. At least the initial  patterns of Europeanization are, accordingly, also likely to be 
distinct, reflecting, on the one hand, a ‘family-typical’ set of domestic circumstances and, on 
the other, cross-temporal variation in what integration implied at the time of joining (see 
below.). 4 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
The second proposition concerning the establishment and perpetuation of families resonates 
with a number of common themes in the study of Europeanization, notably what is now 
variously discussed under the labels of policy transfer, diffusion, cross-border policy learning 
and ‘horizontal’ Europeanization (for reviews see Knill 2005; Holzinger/Knill 2005). The basic 
argument is that such cross-border linkages and exchanges are likely to be most intense in 
cases where common lineage, affinity, partnerships, i.e. ‘unions of deliberate coordination’ 
(Therborn 1993: 329), and a shared space coincide. European integration is not only 
associated with stimulating such cross-border exchanges; rather, in doing so, it may act to 
maintain, enhance or even help to (re-)create family ties, and, thus, promote rather than 
challenge regional distinctness. 
The third proposition, too, is readily compatible with the dominant approach to the definition 
of domestic explanatory variables in Europeanization research, with its orientation towards 
interests, institutions, ideas and identities. It does, however, underline that the chief 
explanatory variables commonly employed may themselves be the result of historical 
experiences of ‘integration’ of a different kind, and, as such, have an important conditioning 
effect on the degree of the cross-regional ‘differential impact’ one is likely to find.  
Whereas the notion of ‘families of nations’ and related concepts help to give a regional 
dimension to what otherwise appear as country-specific, domestic explanations, attention to 
EU-wide center-periphery structures points to a decisive territorial dimension of integration 
and, potentially, Europeanization. Most recent discussions of ‘center’ (or core) and 
‘periphery’ take their clues from the work of Rokkan (1999), who considered center-periphery 
relations within the context of his analysis of political system building, with a focus on state-
formation and nation-building. For Rokkan, territorial centers come in three different types – 
military-administrative, economic and cultural – making them into ‘privileged locations’ within 
the territory (Rokkan 1999: 110ff.). The ‘key characteristics of peripheries are (…) distance, 
difference, and dependence’ (115). A periphery ‘is located at some distance from the 
dominant center or centers’, it possesses ‘some minimum level and sense of separate 
identify’; and it depends on the center in one or more of the following: ‘in political decision-
making, in cultural standardization, and in economic life’ (ibid.: 115). Rokkan was interested 
both in the role of centers and peripheries within states; and in center-periphery structures 
across Europe (Rokkan 1999: 191ff.). 
With a focus on the latter, the issue of prime concern in the present context is the extent to 
which territorial differentiation within the European Union can be understood in terms of 
center-periphery relations. Discussions of Southern Europe and, more recently, Central and 
Eastern Europe are often couched in terms of dependency and distinctness (with advances 
in transport and communication, physical distance may lose some of its former marker 
status). For example, Featherstone and Kazamias’s (2001: 2) comparative analysis of 
Europeanization in Southern and Mediterranean Europe argues that it can be identified as 
an EU ‘”periphery” in terms of a number of predominant traits’, which include, inter alia, I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 5 
‘economic inequality’, ‘the historically distinctive mode of the region’s economic 
development’, ‘financial dependence on EU aid’, and ‘the lesser bargaining strength of the 
“south” in EU treaty negotiations’ (ibid.: 2). Similarly, power asymmetries between the 
dominant EU member states and the new members of CEE have often been noted, as has 
their cultural distinctness and relative economic backwardness. Fractious or broken ‘family 
ties’ may reinforce these aspects of peripherality. Helen Wallace (2001), highlighting the 
relative neglect of the territorial – compared to the functional and affiliational – dimension in 
accounts of integration, contrasts Western and Eastern European experiences. Whilst in 
Western Europe the mutual reinforcement of functional, affiliational and territorial linkages 
have resulted in a ‘distinctive pattern of integration: multi-framework, multi-layer, multi-lateral 
and multi-purpose’ (p. 12), in Central and Eastern Europe we find ‘a segmented history, 
followed by recent attempts to define European engagement by achieving incorporation 
within the west European-defined transnational system. This move ‘towards’ western Europe 
is now beginning, but only beginning, to be flanked by more local patterns of linkage. There 
are also tragic instances of de-linkage where (joint functions) task, territory and (affiliation) 
trust are all contested’ (ibid.: 11).  
Much also tends to be made of the fact that, with the exception of Poland, the new EU 
members are small or very small states. This fact may accentuate their peripherality in terms 
of dependence and further encourage a distinct pattern of Europeanization (Soetendorp and 
Hanf 1998). All of this suggests that peripherality combined with small country status may 
make for differentiation in patterns of Europeanization that is, again, not just country-specific, 
but region-specific. The same applies to territorially-based groups of countries that share 
center characteristics.  
The notion of ‘families of nation’ and attention to center-periphery structures provide 
analytical lenses that may help to account for EU-wide regional clustering of substantive and 
modal patterns of Europeanization. In employing them, we need, however, to be sensitive to 
the malleability of family ties and center-periphery structures. As Therborn (1993: 329) has 
pointed out, ‘families of nations’ come in different forms, based on common descent or 
lineage; consisting of ‘separated siblings’ or ‘kindred nations’; affinity groups; or partnerships, 
as ‘unions of deliberate coordination’. Some of these are constituted by historical 
developments that cannot be undone (but may be reinterpreted); others, notably affinity 
groups and partnerships, may be constituted, reconstituted and dissolved by design or by 
default. Put differently, while ‘families of nations’ may have explanatory power, they are a 
dynamic explanans, which is itself highly susceptible to the process of European integration. 
Thus, it is important to pay attention to how forms of interstate cooperation and coordination 
change over time and how integration itself impacts on the family patterns; it is also 
important to recognize that individual countries may well belong to several groupings at the 
same time. Italy, as both a founder member and a Southern European country, is a case in 
point.  6 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
EU integration itself is, of course, unthinkable without intensive bilateral and multilateral 
territorially-based cooperation and coordination. It may be of long-standing, such as the 
Franco-German partnership, or of more recent origin, such as the Visegrad Group – 
consisting of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – focused on ‘regional 
activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region’ 
(Visegrad Declaration of 2004). While in some cases, bilateral and multilateral linkages serve 
to facilitate cooperation and coordination across a range of arenas and policy issues, others 
are more narrowly defined in purpose. In short, the impact of families of nations on patterns 
of Europeanization can be expected to vary significantly over time, across the European 
space, and across policy domains. 
Center-periphery structures have likewise to be understood as a dynamic variable and, 
again, European integration is an important motor of change (Bartolini 2005). It is, of course, 
an open question whether Europe-wide structures of territorial difference and dependence – 
two of the three key characteristics of peripheries suggested by Rokkan – are reinforced or 
ameliorated by integration. This question has, e.g., been discussed with reference to the 
rationale and effects of European regional and cohesion policy, which is often interpreted as 
a compensation mechanism for EU policies that tend to privilege the center (Allen 2005). 
Similarly, distance, the third criterion, is affected, not so much in a strictly geographical 
sense, although the emergence of new centers may affect this aspect, too, but rather as a 
result of the growing porousness of political, economic and cultural borders and improved 
transport and communication. What seems broadly accepted is that EU economic disparities 
had decreased prior to the accession of the ten new member states (Commission of the 
European Communities 2005) and that some countries, perhaps most notably Ireland, have, 
in the process, shed central defining traits of their former peripheral status. When we look at 
differentiation in the Europeanization experience of multi-country grouping we are, then, 
shooting at a moving target and key explanations for variation are, themselves, dynamic 
rather than static.  
3. Temporality: The Relative Time of Accession 
In shaping patterns of Europeanization, territory interacts with temporality. In the present 
context, the time of accession to the European Union in relation to, first, domestic 
development and, second, the phase of integration at the time of joining the EU are of 
special importance. The basic proposition advanced here is simple: successive 
enlargements have followed a fairly clear regional pattern, integrating groups of countries 
that already shared many important political and socio-economic characteristics. Their 
Europeanization experience is likely to have reinforced this distinctness for two main 
reasons. First, whilst Europeanization interacted strongly with democratization and socio-
economic modernization in some cases, it did not do so in others; second, regionally-based, 
multi-country groupings joined the EU at distinct phases of European integration. Even if one I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 7 
allows for the fact that early patterns of Europeanization may follow a ‘logic of reversibility’ 
(Goetz 2005), one would expect to see signs of path-dependence in later Europeanization 
trajectories.  
The ‘relative time of accession’ has received special attention in the case of the Southern 
European enlargement of the 1980s. Accounts of the Southern Europeanization experience 
routinely note the interaction between integration, post-authoritarian democratization and 
socio-economic modernization, which has been present in the Greek, Portuguese and 
Spanish cases (Featherstone/Kazamias 2001; Pinto/Teixeira 2002; Royo/Manuel 2003). In 
Central and Eastern Europe, these processes are, likewise, closely entangled (Dimitrova 
2004; Pridham 2005). This coincidence, or, conversely, its absence, has ambiguous 
consequences. Countries emerging from authoritarian dictatorship face a greater adaptive 
challenge on their path towards the EU than consolidated democracies; where 
democratization goes hand in hand with a transformation of the economy, as has been the 
case in Central and Eastern Europe, adaptive pressures will be further heightened. The 
likelihood of ‘misfits’ has increased over time, as ‘democratic conditionality’ has moved 
center stage (Grabbe 2003; 2005) and the political and economic acquis of the EU has 
expanded and deepened. The hurdles to accession have been raised considerably between 
the Southern enlargements of the 1980s and the CEE enlargements of the 2000s, as has 
been the insistence of existing member states to impose major costs of adaptation on 
prospective new members prior to accession. Countries in which Europeanization, 
democratization and economic liberalization closely interact are also more likely find 
themselves in the position of policy takers rather than policy shapers, not least because they 
lack the strong domestic institutional foundations of consolidated democracies. This is also 
one of the reasons why the participation of organized interests and civil society in the 
shaping of European policy is limited (Ágh 2004). Adaptive pressures and a strong 
orientation towards ‘policy-taking’ take place in the context of still malleable domestic 
institutions. Put differently, the European project does not encounter a set of historically 
validated and deeply entrenched domestic political institutions. Under these circumstances, 
‘Europe’ can become a decisive ideational reference point both for domestic reform and in 
the quest for the legitimation of the newly established domestic institutions. This contribution 
is critical in shifting the balance between the costs and benefits of Europeanization decisively 
in favor of the later. 
Where integration does not coincide with democratization and liberalization, the pressures 
for adaptation are likely to be much lower, but domestic institutional and policy inertia will be 
higher. Mature liberal democracies with developed market economies have no problems 
meeting the EU’s democracy criteria and will face only moderate ‘misfit’ in EU regulatory 
policies. Joining the EU with a consolidated set of domestic institutions, countries such as 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden or the UK were well-placed to take on the role of policy-shapers, 
further reducing misfit pressures. Moreover, building on national traditions of the participation 
of interest and civil society groups in public policy-making, domestic EU policy-making is set 8 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
to follow a more pluralist pattern. At the same time, however, gains from EU membership in 
terms of democracy are absent and Europe as an ideational reference point in domestic 
political discourse features less prominently. In the absence of a contribution of EU 
membership to democracy, any cost-benefit calculation is skewed towards the regulatory 
dimension.  
These brief remarks already underline that there is a second key aspect to the ‘relative time’ 
of accession, which concerns the phase of integration during which groups of countries join. 
That length of membership matters both in terms of substantive effects – their configuration 
and their depth – and in modes and processes of Europeanization – strategic adaptation 
versus socialization and learning (Börzel/Risse 2003) – seems uncontroversial. The point to 
be emphasized here is that early Europeanization effects, reflecting, in part, the nature of the 
EU at the time of joining, are likely to create path dependencies that influence 
Europeanization trajectories over time. For example, countries that joined the EU at a time 
when ‘integration through law’ was the predominant form of EU policy-making, might find it 
more difficult to reorient their domestic arrangements towards new governance instruments 
than those that have had to confront a more diverse policy repertoire from the beginning. 
Similarly, countries that joined the EU at a time when the domestic costs of integration could 
be cushioned by large transfer payments are likely to develop different patterns of domestic 
mobilization than those in which early adaptational costs remain largely uncompensated.  
4. Evidence of Clustering 
The preceding discussion has argued that territory and temporality help to account for intra-
regional commonalities in domestic variables and inter-regional differences in integration-
related variables that shape the domestic effects of European integration and, thus, promote 
clustered Europeanization. Yet, establishing the existence of such clusters, encompassing 
several countries, is less straightforward than the by-now sizeable collection of 
Europeanization studies might suggest. As with the bulk of work in comparative European 
politics, single-country studies (much of this work is reviewed and summarized in Bulmer/ 
Lequesne 2005) or edited collections based on country-by-country chapters predominate. 
Systematically comparative work is rare and is typically restricted to no more than three or 
four countries; comparative work with a larger number of cases is very scarce (but see 
Anderson 2002). Much of what we know in empirical terms about national trajectories of 
Europeanization along the dimensions of polity, politics and public policy focuses on the 
North-Western core of the founder members of the Communities – France, Germany and the 
Benelux countries –, on the United Kingdom, and on the Nordic countries. This concentration 
is not difficult to explain. As founder members, the North-Western states do, of course, have 
the longest experience of an active engagement with the integration process; as such, they 
are also likely to have been most deeply and enduringly Europeanized. Likewise, 
Europeanization in both the UK and the Nordic states – including Norway as a non-member I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 9 
state – has long been subject to sustained scholarly attention, not least because the 
integration process and its effects on domestic political systems have been fiercely contested 
there in the political realm.  
By contrast, in the cases of the states that joined the EU during the Southern enlargements 
of the 1980s and, in particular, the ten new member states that acceded to the EU in 2004, 
the systematic opening of their political systems to the EU has begun much more recently. 
For the latter group of countries, including eight Central and Eastern European countries, 
Malta and Cyprus, our knowledge is, by necessity, still largely limited to the ‘anticipatory and 
adaptive’ Europeanization (Ágh 2003) prior to accession. However, both Southern Europe 
and, perhaps even more so, Central and Eastern Europe are increasingly moving from the 
margins to the center of Europeanization research, as a crop of recent studies shows. In the 
case of the Southern countries, this takes the form of a reassessment of the role of the 
Southern member states in the European project and of the extent to which EU membership 
has remolded the political systems of the European south (see, e.g., Featherstone/Kazamias 
2001; Pinto/Teixera 2002; Royo/Manuel 2003). As regards the new Central and Eastern 
European states, there is a wave of recent research that charts the influence of integration 
on institutional and policy development in the region (e.g., Ágh 2005; Andonova 2004; 
Dimitrova 2004; Jacoby 2004; Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2005; Vachudová 2005); further 
research work is under way. All of this means that the stock of studies on which cross-
country comparative work can draw – including long-standing members, recent members, 
would-be members, and the few remaining outsiders – is growing rapidly. 
There are, then, many pieces that may help to from a European-wide mosaic; but if we take 
a step back, does a pattern of regional differentiation in Europeanization emerge that 
amounts to more than a random patchwork of cross-country differences? As noted at the 
outset, inquiring into clustered commonalities not only runs counter to the main theme of 
‘non-convergence’; it has also been argued that the search for broader regional patterns is in 
danger of perpetuating outmoded historical notions. This point has, for example, been put 
forcefully by Closa and Heywood (2004: 240) in their study of Spain’s membership in the EU, 
which adopts a Europeanization perspective. Thus, ‘the argument presented in this study 
calls into question the continued analytical utility of notions such as ‘Mediterranean Europe’, 
or the idea that Southern Europe should be seen as distinctive (apart from the obvious fact 
of geographical location)’. Instead, ‘comparative studies of the EU and its member states 
should be built around robust classificatory principles, rather than rely on potentially flawed 
categories derived from historical developments and trajectories’. 
Not everybody takes such a skeptical view, of course. Work that is focused on intra-regional 
comparisons appears to be attractive to scholars, be it, as already mentioned, on Southern 
and Central and Eastern Europe, or on the Nordic region (e.g., Dosenrode/Halkier 2004; 
Egeberg 2005; Ingebritsen 1998; Jacobssen et al. 2003; Miles 1996). It is true that in these 
studies, a degree of regional commonality is typically taken as given (and provides a 10 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
reference point for the discussion of individual country experiences), but in some the aim is 
primarily to establish how much commonality there really is (e.g., Featherstone/Kazamias 
2001).  
For present purposes it is interesting to note that regionally focused comparative analyses 
tend to suggest a greater degree of clustered commonality in Europeanization experiences 
than the advocates of cross-country diversity and non-convergence would lead us to expect. 
This becomes clear if we look at both the substantive Europeanization profile and the modes 
of Europeanization in the Nordic region, Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. 
As regards the Nordic states, with the partial exception of Finland, there is intense political 
contestation over Europe and evidence of a major European effect on electoral behavior and 
party system dynamics (Jenssen et al. 1998; Sitter 2001). At the same, time, in policy terms, 
the Nordic states are set apart from the rest of Europe as model implementers (Sverdrup 
2004). The ‘world of law observance’, identified by Falkner et al. (2005) in their research on 
‘complying with Europe’, is exclusively populated by Nordic member states. But with both 
Denmark and Sweden outside the Euro zone, they show a pattern of differential 
membership. On the institutional side, observers have noted how integration has further 
promoted cooperation within the region (Egeberg 2005) and the transnationalization of 
national governments (Jacobssen et al. 2003).  
The arguments about the effects of territory and temporality developed above help to 
account for these patterns. Thus, the Nordic states have a long history of intensive co-
operation and common policy legacies preceding their intensive engagement with European 
integration (as is, e.g., shown in Esping-Andersen’s (1993) work on ‘worlds of welfare 
capitalism’); it is in line with the ‘families of nations’ argument that integration should have 
strengthened rather than weakened these ties. The ‘relative time’ of accession has been 
especially important in the Nordic context as the Nordic states have engaged with the EU as 
mature democracies with developed market economies. This has meant that they have had 
the institutional capacities to implement European law; that they were able to upload their 
preferences effectively; and that the ‘misfit’ between the EU’s market making and regulating 
legislation and domestic economic governance was, on the whole, limited. At the same time, 
however, there was no ‘democratic’ payoff for the Nordic states from joining the EU, as 
linkages between integration and democratization were non-existent. 
The Southern region offers almost a mirror image of the Nordic scenario: it now stands out in 
Europe for the virtual absence of popular-based or party-based Euroscepticism (Taggart 
1998), but the lack of substantial contestation over integration in Portugal, Spain and Greece 
has not translated into a correspondent capacity to comply with the requirements of 
membership. Thus, both Portugal and Greece belong to what Falkner et al. (2005) call the 
‘world of neglect’ in compliance with EU law, although it should be noted that Spain’s record 
is better in this respect and that implementation records are not uncontroversial (Börzel 
2003; Falkner et al. 2005: 317ff). On the institutional side, Featherstone and Kazamias’s I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 11 
(2001: 13) comparative exploration has highlighted ‘dynamism, asymmetry and 
fragmentation’ as key substantive attributes of the Southern Europeanization experience; 
these effects, are, e.g., visible in the organization of their core executives. Evidence of 
markedly increased co-operation amongst the Mediterranean countries in the wake of 
accession is lacking.  
Territory and temporality do, again, help to account for these patterns. In the Southern 
European case, the explanatory power of ‘families of nations’ is more limited than in the 
Nordic case, for whilst there is evidence of commonalities in aspects of state organization 
(Sotiropoulos 2004) or public policy profiles, the intensity of co-operative ties is lower. By 
contrast, the second dimension of territoriality highlighted above – center-periphery relations 
– is of special relevance and its importance has been reinforced by the Southern countries’ 
relative time of accession. Briefly, at least at the time of joining, Greece, Portugal and Spain 
were in a position of economic backwardness in relation to the Western European founder 
members; ‘dependency’, one of the key criteria of peripherality as set out by Rokkan, was 
not only acknowledged in the form of transfer payments from the center – EU regional, 
structural and cohesion funding – but, arguably, reinforced. But the countries joined at a 
stage in EU development when the ‘core’ was both able and willing to shoulder much of the 
costs of domestic adaptation. Early Europeanization was further aided by the temporal 
coincidence between in integration and domestic democratic consolidation, with EU 
membership widely seen as an aid to, if not a guarantee of, the consolidation of democratic 
regime change; early opposition to EU membership, thus, quickly gave way to unconditional 
support. At the same time, however, all three countries joined at a time when domestic core 
executives capable of the effective ‘uploading’ of domestic preferences to the EU level were 
only beginning to take shape (thus increasing the likelihood of ‘policy misfits’); when 
institutional capacities for the implementation of the acquis communautaire were 
underdeveloped; and when organized civil society was weak. As already briefly indicated, 
recent research on Europeanization in Southern Europe suggests that these conditions at 
the time of joining the EU have had a long-term impact not only in terms of persistent 
compliance problems, but also in fostering elite-centered Europeanization. For example, an 
investigation into the ‘mobilizing’ effects of the EU Convention in Southern Europe has noted 
that ‘the potential in terms of discourse and more generally mobilization around issues raised 
by the Convention was higher than in other areas of the EU’ (ibid.), mainly because ‘Europe 
has always been a fundamental actor in domestic processes of democratization, 
modernization, and policy change in Southern Europe’. Yet, the project found that ‘social 
mobilization was limited and often ‘absorbed’ by party politics (…) there was far less social 
participation than expected’ (ibid.: 21). 
Turning to the new Central and Eastern EU member states, Euroscepticism appears rife – it 
is by no means restricted to Poland (Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004) – and, not surprisingly, there 
are many question marks over their implementation capacity. Full EMU membership, at first 
eagerly desired by the new members, has, by now, become at best a long-term aspiration for 12 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
most. In terms of institutional effects, Europeanization has been associated with 
centralization and the creation of ‘islands of excellence’ in public administration 
(Lippert/Umbach 2005), a development aided by the preference of both the Commission and 
the old member states for dealing with a small number of privileged interlocutors during the 
accession negotiations.  
At first sight, evidence of Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe seems to run 
counter to the argument developed above, namely that where integration and 
democratization coincide, persistent Eurosceptic politics are unlikely to take root. Yet, there 
are at least three factors that distinguish the Central and Eastern Europe case from the 
Southern cluster. First, the time lag between initial regime change and eventual accession 
has been much longer in the case of the most recent enlargement; put simply, accession 
came too late to be ideationally closely associated with successful democratic consolidation. 
Second, the costs of domestic adaptation were higher in the case of Central and Eastern 
Europe, partly because the acquis had, of course, grown enormously since the 1980s, and 
partly because the EU insisted on the full implementation of the acquis (with the exception of 
some temporary derogations) prior to accession. Third, the old member states were less 
willing to compensate the new CEE members for their domestic adaptational costs through 
transfer payments both prior to accession and in the post-accession phase. As a 
consequence, in percentage terms, the EU contribution to the GDP of the new CEE 
members remains much lower than has been the case in Southern Europe.  
The impression of CEE distinctness is further reinforced if we look at the second central 
dimension of differentiation, i.e. modes of Europeanization. In fact, it is in this respect that 
evidence of interregional differentiation is most compelling. In this regard, two issues, in 
particular, have been broadly debated in recent years: the extent to which Europeanization 
involves societal mobilization, i.e. ‘usage of Europe’ (Jacquot/Woll 2003; 2004) beyond the 
confines of state institutions; and the importance of conditionalities in shaping domestic 
responses to EU accession. The Central and Eastern European experience stands out when 
it comes to the role played by conditionalities. The impact of conditonalities on shaping post-
Communist institutional and policy development and pre-accession Europeanization has 
been extensively debated (see, e.g., Grabbe 2003; 2006; Hughes et al. 2004a; 2004b; Smith 
2003; Schimmelfenning/Sedelmeier 2004; 2005), although, predictably, the outcome of this 
debate has been inconclusive. Some contributions stress the importance of conditionalities 
as a key component of the ‘external governance’ to which the countries of CEE have been 
subjected (Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004; 2005); others note the obstacles to the 
external direction of domestic change, be it in territorial organization and regional policy 
(Brusis 2002; Hughes et al. 2004a; 2004b) or budgetary policy (Dimitrov/Goetz/Wollmann 
2006). What can scarcely be doubted is that the EU approach to accession has been more 
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Modes of Europeanization do not just matter in their own right, but because they influence 
the substantive institutional, policy and political effects of accession. In Central and Eastern 
Europe, Europeanization could have been expected to have been more immediate than in 
other parts of the EU (Grabbe 2001; Goetz 2005). Oft-cited reasons include, inter alia, the 
weakness of institutional ‘cores’ in the post-Communist states – notably those that only came 
into being after the fall of Communism – which are less likely to offer resistance to ‘adaptive 
pressures’ than the deeply embedded state institutions of Western Europe; evident crises of 
performance and legitimacy of domestic institutions, which encourage policy transfer and 
learning from foreign experiences; and the existence of institutional and policy ‘voids’, so that 
Europeanization involves not so much adaptation, but rather the ab ovo creation of new 
actors, institutions and policies. On the other hand, there are equally good arguments to 
suggest that Europeanization effects, whilst more immediate, may also be less profound and 
that patterns of ‘institutionalization for reversibility’ prevail. Thus, the new members had little 
incentive to invest in ‘deep’ Europeanization that would ‘lock in’ specific institutional and 
policy arrangements prior to full membership precisely because of their weak uploading 
capacity as demandeurs. They could hope that, as full members, they would be able to 
challenge, or escape altogether, some of the constrictions that a negotiation process that 
was structured to favor the existing members had imposed on them. Moreover, processes of 
socialization and learning that would lend depth and durability to Europeanization and could 
support and complement consequentialist institutional and policy adaptation will take time.  
In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, too, then, territory and temporality have 
mattered. The relative time of accession meant that EU membership imposed major adaptive 
costs on the new Central and Eastern European member states – not least because of an 
extended official and unofficial acquis, without the cushion provided by extensive transfer 
payments, as in the case of the Southern enlargement. ‘Families of nations’ have mattered 
here in the form of the common inheritance of Communism and commonalities in the 
challenges of democratic regime change that these countries have encountered. 
Peripherality, combined with small country status (with the exception of Poland), has further 
encouraged a top-down mode of Europeanization.  
5. Conclusion: Territory beyond State Boundaries  
This paper has sought to make a case for clustered convergence in patterns of 
Europeanization, i.e. the existence of regionally-based multi-country groupings that share a 
common Europeanization experience and has illustrated the importance of territory and 
temporality in explaining this clustering with reference to the Nordic countries, Southern 
Europe, and Central and Eastern Europe. Of course, this argument is open to challenges 
both on empirical and theoretical grounds. For example, should Italy be considered part of 
the Southern cluster? It is often included in analyses of the Southern European experience 
of integration and Europeanization, but it is, of course, a founder member state, and, thus, 14 — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — I H S 
 
 
differs on at least one important variable, the time of accession relative to the stage of 
European integration. Perhaps more importantly, do the founder members, as our discussion 
would imply, in themselves constitute a distinct cluster in terms of both substantive polity, 
politics and policy effects and modes of Europeanization? Theoretically, even if one 
acknowledges the importance of territory and temporality in principle, it is clear that much 
more detailed analysis is required to trace the chain of causation from these factors through 
their impact on domestic and integration-related variables to patterns of Europeanization. 
The argument presented here is, thus, primarily intended to stimulate research and 
reflection.  
But are country groupings the appropriate unit of analysis? Considering this question leads 
us to broader issues about the study of Europeanization and its limitations. Challenges to 
territoriality as an ordering principle of the modern polity, in which the four key dimensions of 
control over resources, the rule of law and sovereignty, legitimation, and welfare provision 
coincided and reinforced each other within the framework of the modern nation-state 
(Zürn/Leibfried 2005), are now widely regarded as undermining the classical nation-state 
model. Di Palma (2004: 259) argues with reference to Ruggie’s argument (1993) about the 
‘unbundling of territoriality’ in the context of the European project,  
‘to unbundle territoriality means to recompose and rebundle it. It means to recognize 
the presence, in the political space below and beyond the state, of a variety of 
territorially relevant collective actors: some private, some public and legal (or indeed 
illegal), some constitutionalized (…) in some ways, the multiplicity of actors subtracts 
from the centrality of the national state. In other ways, it involves a repositioning of 
the state and the emergence of new state tasks’.  
Based on central tenets of Rokkan’s work, Bartolini (2005) has recently analyzed European 
integration as ‘the formation of an enlarged territorial system’, revolving around center 
formation, system building and political structuring. Yet, with its focus on changes within the 
‘container’ (Taylor 1994) of the nation-state, the analytical lens of Europeanization is, 
arguably, not especially well placed to capture and explain the transformation of governance 
between and amongst member states. We find references to ‘horizontal’ Europeanization, 
but that tends to be associated with non-hierarchical mechanisms of domestic 
Europeanization such as cross-border policy transfer, learning and diffusion (Radaelli 2003: 
4), and not the constitution of a transnational policy space. It follows from this that the search 
for clusters of Europeanization, and especially their historical evolution, may well need to 
take country borders as its starting point; but as the European integration process 
progresses, the relevance of these borders in producing distinct Europeanization profiles 
becomes more doubtful. This is not to argue that we should focus on sectoral patterns of 
Europeanization at the expense of examining broader territorial patterns; but these distinct 
territorial patterns are increasingly less likely to coincide more or less neatly with state 
boundaries.  I H S — Klaus H. Goetz / Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization — 15 
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